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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

TEACHING TORTS WITHOUT INSURANCE: A SECOND-BEST
SOLUTION

DAVID A. FISCHER* AND ROBERT H. JERRY, II**
Teachers, scholars and practitioners have long appreciated the symbiotic
relationship of torts and insurance. Indeed, the assertion that tort law and
insurance law are intertwined is utterly unremarkable; many commentators
have observed that tort law cannot be understood if the business of insurance
and the law regulating it is ignored, and that insurance law cannot be
understood if tort law is ignored.1 Several generations of law students have
* James Lewis Parks Professor, University of Missouri-Columbia School of Law.
** Floyd R. Gibson Missouri Endowed Professor, University of Missouri-Columbia School of
Law. The authors express appreciation to Michele L. Mekel and John L. Wood for their research
assistance.
1. See, e.g., Tom Baker, The Incidence, Scope, and Purpose of Punitive Damages:
Reconsidering Insurance for Punitive Damages, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 101, 130 (1998) (“[T]ort law
cannot be fully understood without paying close attention to insurance, and insurance law cannot
be understood without paying close attention to tort law.”); Seth J. Chandler, The Interaction of
the Tort System and Liability Insurance Regulation: Understanding Moral Hazard, 2 CONN. INS.
L.J. 91, 93 (1996) (“The tort system and the insurance regulatory system work together to
determine the welfare of injurers and victims in society. Neither one can be understood properly
without an understanding of the other.”); PETER CANE, TORT LAW AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS
432 (2d ed. 1991) (“It is now accepted wisdom that the practical operation of the law of tort
cannot be understood without paying attention to the fact and extent of insurance, whether it be
liability (that is, third-party) insurance, loss (that is, first-party) insurance, or legal expenses
insurance (which covers the cost of making or defending legal claims).”); Kent D. Syverud, The
Duty to Settle, 76 VA. L. REV. 1113, 1114 (1990) (“Tort litigation and liability insurance are
symbiotic institutions. They are dissimilar organisms intimately associated in a mutually
beneficial relationship.”) [hereinafter Syverud, The Duty to Settle]; Allen E. Smith, The
Miscegenetic Union of Liability Insurance and Tort Process in the Personal Injury Claims
System, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 645, 646 (1969) (“The relationship of liability insurance and the tort
process is difficult to characterize in a pithy phrase. . . . [A] ‘miscegenetic union’—like that of
fish and fowl—incapable of producing social welfare as its offspring, seems most apt as a
shorthand description.”); Fleming James, Jr. & John V. Thornton, The Impact of Insurance on the
Law of Torts, 15 L. & CONT. PROB. 431, 444 (1950) (“Insurance in the law of torts has served
during the past fifty years to modify some legal rules and to broaden both the base of recovery
and the possibility of recovery.”); MARC A. FRANKLIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORT LAW
AND ALTERNATIVES 444 (1971) (“Private insurance . . . and social insurance have greatly
influenced the formal and informal development of tort law . . . .”); DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF
TORTS 45 (2000) (“[T]ort law does not operate in a sterile laboratory. Its hope for compensation
and its hope for deterrence, for corrective justice and for social utility are all among the aspects of
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read casebooks, which in varying degrees pay homage to the connections
between torts and insurance.2 Many law review articles3 and noteworthy
books (or portions thereof)4 have plumbed the tort-insurance relationship.
Although one of us has taught Torts for many years but has never taught
Insurance,5 and the other of us has taught Insurance for many years but has
never taught Torts,6 both of us have both long believed that each of our
tort law affected by the presence of liability insurance.”); MARK C. RAHDERT, COVERING
ACCIDENT COSTS: INSURANCE LIABILITY, AND TORT REFORM 1 (1995) (“Scarcely anyone
familiar with the American system for tort compensation would deny that it has been profoundly
influenced in the twentieth century by the fact that many, if not most, defendants who wind up
paying damages to plaintiffs both are able to and do routinely insure against such losses.”). The
interconnections also have significant implications for proponents of tort and insurance reforms.
See Kenneth S. Abraham & Lance Liebman, Private Insurance, Social Insurance, and Tort
Reform: Toward a New Vision of Compensation for Illness and Injury, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 75,
75-76 (1993) (“Proposals to reform tort law often do not recognize the role played by public and
private insurance programs in compensating for health care expenses and lost income, even
though insurance programs dwarf tort law as a system of reimbursement.”). This premise is not,
however, without its detractors. See W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS 589, 596 (5th ed. 1984) (“Although liability insurance undoubtedly has had its
effect, a dispassionate observer, if one is to be found in this area, might quite as readily conclude
that the impact of insurance upon the law of torts has been amazingly slight; that most of the
changes that have been pointed out are due to other causes; and that it is in truth astonishing that a
system by which the defendants can and do obtain relief from all liability upon payment of a
relatively small premium has received so little mention and visible recognition in the tort
decisions. . . . The list is far from being an impressive testimonial to the importance of liability
insurance as a factor in the development of the law of torts up to the present day.”).
2. See, e.g., JAMES A. HENDERSON ET AL., THE TORTS PROCESS 701-19 (5th ed. 1999);
LEON GREEN ET AL., CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 635-52 (2d ed. 1977); FRANKLIN, supra note
1, at 442-512.
3. See, e.g., Fleming James, Jr., Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability
Insurance, 57 YALE L.J. 549 (1948); Michael J. Trebilcock, The Role of Insurance
Considerations in the Choice of Efficient Civil Liability Rules, 4 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 243 (1988);
Seth J. Chandler, supra note 1; George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort
Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521 (1987).
4. See, e.g., RAHDERT, supra note 1 (discussing influence of insurance on substantive rules
of tort law); STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 186-227, 235-45
(1987); A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 67-76 (2d ed.
1989); I REPORTERS’ STUDY, AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR
PERSONAL INJURY 55-103 (1991) (analyzing functioning of tort system in relationship to liability
insurance “crisis” of mid-1980s).
5. Professor Fischer has taught Torts for almost thirty years and Products Liability for
almost twenty years.
6. This refers to Professor Jerry, who has taught Insurance Law for almost twenty years.
When he teaches in the first-year curriculum, his course is Contracts. The common wisdom
among insurance scholars is that most of them approach the study of insurance law from a torts
perspective as opposed to a contracts perspective, but a review of the information provided by
law school faculty in THE AALS DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS 2000-01 shows a fairly narrow
gap between the two perspectives: a total of one hundred sixty-six law faculty self-identify as
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respective principal subjects is diminished if it is studied without the rich
context provided by the other’s primary field. Neither of us would operate a
motor vehicle, set up a business, or venture very far from home without
insurance; we suggest that it is just as unwise to teach torts without insurance.
We do not dwell, however, on what is lost in torts if insurance is ignored.
Rather, we examine how the study of torts is enriched when insurance concepts
play a role in students’ analysis. Our discussion is divided into two parts. Part
I offers a “macro” perspective on the connections between tort and insurance.
In this Part, we summarize the principal issues in play when the purposes of
tort law are analyzed against the backdrop of first-party and third-party
insurance compensation mechanisms. Part II provides a “micro” perspective
on tort-insurance connections. In this section, we take a sample of discrete tort
law principles, representative of those discussed in a typical first-year torts
course, and we discuss how a student’s understanding of these doctrines can be
enriched if an insurance perspective is combined with the traditional “tort
presentation.” We offer a few concluding thoughts in Part III.
I. A “MACRO” PERSPECTIVE ON THE CONNECTIONS BETWEEN TORTS AND
INSURANCE
Although many interesting points are embedded in the voluminous array of
teaching materials and scholarship on the torts-insurance intersection, we
underscore two particularly important ones. First, whether tort law’s
substantive doctrines successfully implement tort law’s underlying policies
cannot be assessed without considering the influence of insurance. Second, the
impact of insurance on the tort litigation process is so profound as to make it
impossible to understand tort litigation without understanding the structure of
the liability insurance contract. We will take up each of these observations in
turn, but to put this discussion in context, we first provide a brief overview of
the liability insurance contract.
A.

The Origin, Structure and Purposes of the Liability Insurance Contract

Not much could be said about tort law before 1850; this would change with
the arrival of the Industrial Revolution.7 Initially, courts were unsympathetic
now teaching or having taught Insurance Law, and sixty of these also self-identify as now
teaching or having taught Torts, whereas forty-six self-identify as now teaching or having taught
Contracts. Interestingly, the gap appears to be wider with newer faculty: of thirty-three law
faculty with one to five years experience who are teaching Insurance Law in the 2000-01
academic year, twenty-four indicate that they are currently teaching Torts, whereas only ten
indicate that they are currently teaching Contracts. (Professor Jerry appreciates the assistance of
John Wood in compiling this data, a copy of which is on file with the Saint Louis University Law
Journal.)
7. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 299-302, 467-68 (2d ed.
1985); G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 3-4 (1985).
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to efforts to expand the liability of firms for injuries suffered by employees,8
but statutory reforms in the late nineteenth century, along with judicial
relaxation of limitations on recovery imposed in earlier years, removed many
of these barriers.9 Almost as quickly as the new liabilities developed, insurers
brought “employers’ liability insurance”10 to the market. In 1886, an English
insurer issued what is thought to be the first policy of liability insurance in the
United States;11 the insurer promised that it “will pay to the Employer or his
8. See Edmund Dwight, How Employers’ Liability Entered U.S., THE EASTERN
UNDERWRITER, Mar. 28, 1930, at 37 (“[T]he theory of the common law as it had developed up to
the third quarter of the last century enabled the employer to interpose so many defences against a
claim for damages suffered by his injured workman that a suit at common law gradually came to
be a poor remedy . . . .”). Prior to the era of industrialization, injured workers typically relied on
the charitable benevolence of their employers. The changing relationship between employers and
workers in the new economy altered to the point of elimination this manner of caring for the
injured. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at
208 (1977). In his remarkable study of all nineteenth century tort cases decided by New
Hampshire and California courts, Professor Gary Schwartz verifies that the courts of those two
states were generally pro-defendant in employer-employee cases. Gary T. Schwartz, Tort Law
and the Economy in Nineteenth-Century America: A Reinterpretation, 90 YALE L.J. 1717, 176869 (1981). His study, however, disputes the generally accepted view that nineteenth century
common law courts adopted restrictive rules that gave emerging industries protection from
liability to non-employees. The California and New Hampshire cases were very protective of
accident victims in suits against emerging industries. Id. at 1771.
9. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 477-85.
10. See Sylvester C. Dunham, Liability Insurance, in II YALE INSURANCE LECTURES 233
(1903-04) [hereinafter YALE INSURANCE LECTURES].
11. This policy was issued by The Employers Liability Assurance Corporation, Ltd., an
English company which shortly before 1886 had established an American branch in Boston. See
Edwin W. DeLeon, Historical Sketch, in, II THE BUSINESS OF INSURANCE: A TEXT BOOK AND
REFERENCE WORK COVERING ALL LINES OF INSURANCE 191 (Howard P. Dunham ed., 1912)
[hereinafter THE BUSINESS OF INSURANCE]. This detail is corroborated by the agent who
supposedly sold “Policy No. 1” in the United States. See Dwight, supra note 8. See also
Raymond N. Caverly, The Background of the Casualty and Bonding Business in the United
States, INS. COUNSEL J. 62, 63 (1939) (crediting Employers Liability Assurance with selling first
third-party liability policy in the United States). The first policy was limited to coverage for
employers’ liability to employees, not to the company’s potential liability to the public. Caverly,
who in 1939 was the Vice President of the Fidelity and Casualty Company of New York,
attributed this to “the fact that they did not have ambulance chasing lawyers in those days.” Id. at
63 (quoting June 1902 discussion in The Insurance Post on “ambulance chasers”). The timing of
the creation of the Employers Liability Assurance Corporation’s branch in Boston does not seem
coincidental; by 1886, the possibility of placing liability on employers for workplace injuries
must have been under active discussion, as the first employers liability law would be enacted in
1887 in Massachusetts, and many other states would soon follow suit. See DeLeon, supra, at
192-211; Dunham, Liability Insurance, supra note 10, at 227 (describing employers liability acts,
and how they limited the employers’ defense that the employee’s injury was caused by the
negligence of a “fellow servant”). The English Employers’ Liability Act was enacted in 1880.
See C.A. KULP & JOHN W. HALL, CASUALTY INSURANCE 21 (4th ed. 1968). It was no doubt a
reasonable prediction at the time that the concept would spread across the Atlantic.
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legal representatives all such sums for which such Employer shall become
liable to his workmen by virtue of the Common Law or any Statute with the
following limitations and conditions. . . .”12 Additional insurers quickly
entered this market, and the total annual premiums written by liability insurers
in the United States grew ninety-fold between 1887 and 1906 (from
approximately $200,000 to more than $110 million).13 As the range of
activities on which liabilities were imposed expanded,14 the coverage of the
liability policy expanded as well; by 1912 one commentator described the
typical policy in the United States as providing broad protection “against the
legal liability of the Assured arising from bodily injuries resulting from
negligence.”15
Growth in premium volume continued throughout the twentieth century.16
By 1998, more than $107 billion was spent annually in the United States on

It is possible, however, that the employers’ liability policies may have been preceded by
a kind of liability insurance sold to owners of steam boilers. According to an 1893 commentary
on the “new” employers’ liability coverage, “[i]t has been a long time usual for companies doing
this insurance to cover the liability of the owners of boilers in case of personal injuries, whether
to employes [sic] or others, caused by explosions of their boilers. It will be seen that this feature
of the boiler policy is quite within the definition of Employers’ Liability insurance given in the
New York law.” George F. Seward, Liability Insurance, THE WKLY. UNDERWRITER, July 1,
1893, at 495. To the same effect is W.F. Moore, Liability Insurance, THE WKLY. UNDERWRITER,
MAY 20, 1905, at 485 (noting that steam boiler began as property insurance, but indicating that
almost all present boiler coverage has liability insurance component). Professor Jerry expresses
his appreciation to Ms. Sheila Mulrennan, of the Insurance Archaelogy Group in New York, for
sharing with him documentation she compiled on the origins and development of liability
insurance in the United States.
12. “Employers’ Liability Policy” issued to the Gender and Paeschle Manufacturing Co.,
Oct. 28, 1886 (copy on file with the Saint Louis University Law Journal). Coverage for workers
compensation, which would first appear on the United States scene in the 1910s, could be added
by endorsement. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 682; R.S. Keelob, Liability Policy Forms, in
THE BUSINESS OF INSURANCE, supra note 11, at 214.
13. Keelob, supra note 12, at 203. See also YALE INSURANCE LECTURES, supra note 10, at
233 (in reference to employee claims against employers, “[t]he development of liability insurance
as the instrumentality for sharing and distributing such losses and expenses was probably only
hastened by the later definite course taken by the courts and the legislatures.”).
14. According to Kulp and Hall, contractors’ coverage began in 1886, elevator coverage in
1888, teams in 1891, manufacturers in 1892, owners-landlords-tenants in 1894, and contractual in
1900. More recent additions were product (originally called “poison”) coverage in 1910, sports
in 1915, accountants in 1923, personal in 1932, and storekeepers in 1948. KULP & HALL, supra
note 11, at 22.
15. Keelob, supra note 12, at 213.
16. By 1951, liability insurance premium dollars for auto property damage and bodily injury
liability and “miscellaneous” property damage and bodily injury totaled $1.935 billion, and this
figure would grow to $7.25 billion by 1966. KULP & HALL, supra note 11, at 23 tbl. 2-1 (based
on data from Best’s Fire and Casualty Aggregates and Averages).
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liability insurance,17 which amounted to $380 for every person in the nation18
and approximately 1.1% of gross domestic product (GDP).19 These are large
numbers, but the benefits provided by liability insurance are also enormous.
Liability insurance gives individuals and firms some measure of security
against the risk of financial ruin that can result if one’s tortious conduct causes
substantial injury to a third party. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how the
modern national and global economies could have matured and developed
without the protection afforded to commercial enterprises from the
consequences of their acts and neglect upon others.
A policy of insurance is a contract between insurer and policyholder, and
like any contract, the insurance policy creates rights and duties between these
two parties. In contrast to “first-party” coverage, which insures the
policyholder’s own interest in a piece of property or a life, liability insurance
protects the policyholder against her risk of being liable in tort for damages
owed to a third party. Both the first-party and third-party contract protect the
policyholder’s interests, but when the insurer pays proceeds under the liability
insurance contract, the proceeds go not to the policyholder, but to the person to
whom the policyholder is indebted by virtue of a judgment or settlement. That
is the reason liability insurance is often labeled “third-party” insurance, even
though the rights and duties in the contract, like first-party insurance, run
between policyholder and insurer.20
Although contract law would afford third-party rights to an intended
beneficiary (i.e., a tort victim) of the liability insurance contract, standard
17. According to data assembled by the A.M. Best Co., Inc., in 1998 total premiums in the
United States in the following lines of insurance were as follows: private passenger auto liability,
$70.6 billion; commercial auto liability, $13.0 billion; medical malpractice, $5.1 billion; and
general liability (including product liability), $19.0 billion, for a total of $107.7 billion.
INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, FACT BOOK 2000 1.9 (1999).
18. As of April 1, 2000, the United States resident population was thought to be
281,421,906. U. S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, CENSUS 2000 SHOWS RESIDENT POPULATION OF
281,421,906; APPORTIONMENT COUNTS DELIVERED TO PRESIDENT (Dec. 28, 2000), available at
http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/2000/cb00cn64.html.
19. GDP was estimated at $9,752.7 billion in the first quarter of 2000. See Survey of
Current Business (Jan. 2001) at D-3 (copy on file with the Saint Louis University Law Journal).
Professor Kent Syverud performed this calculation with the same sources in 1994 using 1988-89
data. He found per-person expenditures at $300 and the percentage of GDP to be 1.89%. See
Kent D. Syverud, On the Demand for Liability Insurance, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1629 (1994). The
economic boom of the 1990s exceeded the growth in liability insurance, which accounts for the
percentage decline; but the increase in per-person expenditures shows that the demand for
liability insurance remains very high. The long-term growth in liability insurance is indisputable;
the foregoing data show that liability insurance grew fifty-six fold from 1951 to 1998, while GDP
grew twenty-six fold during the same period. Comparing data from Bureau of Econ. Analysis,
U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, GDP and Other Major NIPA Series, 1929-2000, 80 SURV. OF CURRENT
BUS. 120 tbl.1 (2000), with supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
20. See ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 38-39 (2d ed. 1996).
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liability insurance policies contain a “no-action clause,” which expressly states
that the contract creates no rights in third parties unless and until a judgment is
entered against the policyholder. This means that a victim of a tort cannot sue
the insurer directly in tort for the consequences of the policyholder’s allegedly
wrongful conduct; the tort victim is not in privity with the insurer, and the
contract does not bestow third-party rights on the victim. (In a very few states,
statutory law provides a direct action to the tort victim against the insurer, and
it is not uncommon for state statutes to provide limited direct action rights for
discrete kinds of coverages, such as liability insurance for common carriers.21)
This means the third-party’s tort claim must be brought against the
policyholder; if the claim is within the coverage, the insurer will provide a
defense to this claim and will indemnify the insured against any resulting
judgment or settlement by paying proceeds to the plaintiff-victim. Thus, at
least in theory, the tort claim owned by the victim is to be resolved in
accordance with the same substantive rules that apply irrespective of the
tortfeasor’s insurance coverage. As a practical matter, however, the presence
of insurance makes a huge difference in how the victim’s liability claim is
pursued, a topic taken up in more detail later in this Part.22
Although liability insurance had its origins in protecting insureds against
liabilities that might become owed to third parties, the compensatory potential
of private liability insurance was recognized early on. Almost as soon as
automobiles began to share highways with horses and carriages, the dangers of
this new product were all too apparent, and the lack of compensation for
highway injuries quickly became a matter of public concern.23 Some early
proposed reforms favored mandatory first-party insurance that would pay
victims directly without regard to fault,24 but the first statutory reforms

21. See JERRY, supra note 20, at 548-51. Note that if a first-party policy of property
insurance pays for a loss caused by the negligence of a third-party, tort law will still be relevant to
the insurer’s rights. After paying the insured loss, the insurer will be subrogated to the insured’s
rights against third parties, meaning the tortfeasor that caused the insured’s loss. The insurer’s
claim as subrogee will be asserted in the name of the insured; after the successful assertion of
subrogation, the loss will ultimately fall on the party that caused it, i.e., the tortfeasor. If the
tortfeasor has liability insurance, the victim-insured’s insurer will seek recovery, then, from the
tortfeasor’s insurer. For more on subrogation in the insurance context, see id. at 600-27.
22. See discussion in Part I.C.
23. See JERRY S. ROSENBLOOM, AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY CLAIMS: INSURANCE COMPANY
PHILOSOPHIES AND PRACTICES 1 (1968) (“‘Carriages without horses shall go, [a]nd accidents fill
the world with woe.’ With the advent of the automobile, the above prophecy credited to a 16thcentury philosopher has proved to be a correct assessment of the 20th century. The automobile
has influenced almost every facet of modern life and, unfortunately has precipitated a reign of
terror on the American highways. . . . It is apparent from the date that both highway usage and
motor vehicle accidents have shown steady increases since 1920 . . . .”).
24. See, e.g., Ernest C. Carman, Is a Motor Vehicle Accident Compensation Act Advisable, 4
MINN. L. REV. 1 (1919). For a summary of other early automobile accident compensation
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required owners of motor vehicles to purchase liability insurance or
demonstrate financial responsibility so that the victims of accidents would be
compensated.25 Statutory requirements that liability insurers pay proceeds to
victims even if the insured-tortfeasor were insolvent (and thus could never be
able to satisfy a judgment) underscored the fact that liability insurance was
understood to have compensatory purposes that transcend the product’s role in
indemnifying policyholders from the consequences of their tortious conduct.26
B.

Insurance and the Objectives of Tort Law

By most accounts, three normative perspectives compete to define the
objectives of tort law: the economic perspective; the corrective justice
perspective; and the compensation perspective.
Insurance has major
implications for each.
The economic perspective, which is the core of most modern law and
economics scholarship as it pertains to tort law, is concerned with the impact
of liability, including potential liability, on individual behavior. Richard
Posner was the first scholar to use economic analysis to explain the tort
system.27 Numerous other scholars have now joined Posner in using
economics to analyze tort cases.28 This approach emphasizes deterrence.
Proponents of this perspective “evaluate existing legal doctrine or proposed
reforms in terms of whether appropriate incentives are created for the various
causal contributors to a given personal injury to minimize the sum of accident
and avoidance costs by taking cost-justified precautions that will reduce the
likelihood and severity of that outcome.”29
Insurance has obvious implications for the deterrence objectives of tort
law. If injurers are risk neutral the prospect of liability will lead them to take
appropriate precautions.30 A risk-neutral actor would spend $450 to prevent a
$500 accident, but would not spend $550 to prevent the accident. This is
proposals, see ROBERT H. JOOST, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE AND NO-FAULT LAW 2D § 2:9, at 910 (1992).
25. See JERRY, supra note 20, at 843-49.
26. See JOOST, supra note 24, § 2:7, at 8 (“The law of torts began to put less emphasis on the
fault concept, with its concern for the actor rather than the victim, and more emphasis on
increasing the number of accident victims who were entitled to receive compensation.”).
27. Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and
Corrective Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801, 1806 (1997); see Richard A. Posner, A Theory of
Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972); Richard A. Posner, Killing or Wounding to Protect a
Property Interest, 14 J.L. & ECON. 201 (1971).
28. See, e.g., SHAVELL, supra note 4; Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of
Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 69 (1975); Saul Levmore, Probabilistic
Recoveries, Restitution, and Recurring Wrongs, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 691 (1990).
29. DON DEWEES ET AL., EXPLORING THE DOMAIN OF ACCIDENT LAW: TAKING THE FACTS
SERIOUSLY 5 (1996).
30. SHAVELL, supra note 4, at 209.
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socially desirable because it is wasteful to spend $550 to save $500. Waste
occurs because resources spent to prevent accidents are just as valuable as
resources lost because of accidents. If injurers are risk averse, however, they
may be led to take excessive precautions (i.e., spending $550 to prevent a $500
loss) or to engage in too little activity (depending on the liability rule and how
accurately courts determine negligence).31 Making liability insurance available
to risk-averse injurers corrects this problem, but only if insurers can charge
premiums according to each injurer’s level of care.32 If, for example, an
injurer uses a level of care that creates a five percent risk of causing $10,000 in
damages, the appropriate insurance premium is $500, but if her level of care
creates an eight percent risk of causing the same damages, her premium should
be $800.33 If the injurer can reduce the level of risk that she creates from eight
percent to five percent for less than $300, she will do so because her premium
will be reduced by $300, which is more than the cost of taking the additional
precautions. Thus, the desire to reduce the insurance premium induces
insureds to use cost-justified precautions.
It is obviously impossible for insurers to set premiums with the precision
suggested by the above example. Attempting to determine the precise level of
risk created by an insured would often require a very costly investigation.
Furthermore, the attempt would often be futile because the level of care that an
insured uses may vary from activity to activity and from time to time. If
insurers cannot ascertain injurers’ levels of care, liability insurance can cause
injurers to take less than optimal care.34 Indeed, this concern with moral
hazard35 explains nineteenth century opposition to liability insurance in some
circles, a view that was not rejected until early in the twentieth century.36
Insurance companies can partially correct the moral hazard problem by
structuring coverage and premiums in such a way as to control the risks created

31. Id. at 209-13.
32. Id. at 211; Gary T. Schwartz, The Ethics and the Economics of Tort Liability Insurance,
75 CORNELL L. REV. 313, 337-49 (1990). For a discussion of how insurers classify risks and set
prices, see KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND
PUBLIC POLICY 64-100 (1986).
33. SHAVELL, supra note 4, example 9.1 at 207 and example 9.3 at 211.
34. Id. at 211-12.
35. Moral hazard refers to insurance’s inherent tendency to increase loss through either
intentional destruction of property or lives or, as is more typically the case, the diminished
incentives created to prevent loss to property through the failure to take precautions at the margin
that would reduce the incidence of loss. For more on moral hazard, the tort system, and
insurance, see Chandler, supra note 1.
36. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, at 585-86. In England, liability insurance was
considered to be against public policy until the last half of the nineteenth century. See W.A.
DINSDALE, HISTORY OF ACCIDENT INSURANCE LAW IN GREAT BRITAIN 176-77 (1954).
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by the insured.37 Examples include sharing the risk with insureds by issuing
policies that do not cover the entire risk, making premium adjustments based
on the insured’s history of claims, and requiring insureds to take precautions
(such as installing sprinkler systems) that reduce risk.38 While these measures
probably do not eliminate all of the problems caused by inaccurate pricing of
insurance, the measures likely ameliorate the problems sufficiently so that less
harm results from inaccurate pricing than would result from the disallowance
of insurance. If insurance were unavailable, risk-averse actors would either
refrain from offering some socially desirable goods and services or would offer
them only at excessively high prices.39 Therefore, the disallowance of
insurance would harm the users of those goods and services.40
Although much more can be said about the effect of insurance on
incentives to use care,41 further detail is beyond the scope of this Article. The
point for our purposes is that tort law, by itself, cannot achieve optimal levels
of deterrence; this will occur only if liability insurance is available and is
accurately priced, and this, in turn, will not happen if insurance law and
regulation operate inefficiently so as to frustrate accurate pricing.42
A second normative perspective stresses corrective justice. Under this
view, the purpose of tort law is to nullify losses and gains that arise between
individuals when one individual wrongfully injures the other.43 Aristotle is
37. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111
HARV. L. REV. 869, 932 (1998).
38. Id. at 933. For more discussion on the effect of the price of insurance on levels of care,
see ABRAHAM, supra note 32, at 10-18, 45-49.
39. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 37, at 933. A risk-averse firm that self-insures will
charge a larger “premium” for the insurance than will a liability insurance company. The firm’s
premium will include a sum sufficient to cover the risk insured against and an additional sum to
compensate the firm for “being subject to risk—something it does not like . . . .” Id.
40. Id.
41. For an insightful discussion of the issue and an elaboration upon Polinsky and Shavell,
see Schwartz, supra note 32, at 336-59.
42. Judge Richard Posner argues that the normative premise of the tort system should be
wealth maximization. Each person is a potential injurer and a potential victim, and thus
purchases both liability insurance and first-party insurance to convert uncertain future losses into
current certain costs. This mix of insurance purchased will be affected by the extent to which
negligence or strict liability dominates the tort system (strict liability encourages more liability
insurance, and negligence encourages more loss insurance; the price of the insurance is a function
of the liability rules, as a strict liability environment makes liability insurance more expensive,
and a negligence environment makes first-party insurance more expensive due to the larger
number of uncompensated torts). A negligence regime will be optimal if it produces lower total
premiums and everyone prefers that regime ex ante, even though some individuals will be left
worse off ex poste. See Richard A. Posner, Wealth Maximization and Tort Law: A Philosophical
Inquiry, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 103-05 (David G. Owen ed., 1995).
This framework also depends on the availability and accurate pricing of insurance.
43. Catharine Pierce Wells, Tort Law as Corrective Justice: A Pragmatic Justification for
Jury Adjudication, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2348, 2350, 2355 (1990).
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usually credited as the first to articulate a theory of corrective justice.44 The
first modern explanation of the relationship of corrective justice to tort theory
appeared in an article written by George Fletcher in 1972.45 In recent years,
numerous scholars have emphasized a corrective justice rationale for tort law.46
These scholars advocate widely divergent theories of how to define the concept
of corrective justice.47
At first glance, liability insurance might seem to be completely
inconsistent with the corrective justice perspective. A number of scholars have
adopted this position, arguing that liability insurance undermines corrective
justice because the notion of “personal responsibility based on fault” is
abandoned when insured wrongdoers do not “themselves” compensate
victims.48 Others contend that the existence of liability insurance is compatible
with at least some versions of the corrective justice perspective.49 For
example, Ernest Weinrib, a leading corrective justice scholar, states:
[C]orrective justice is applicable in the modern world despite the fact that the
prevalence of liability insurance means that the defendant personally does not
compensate the plaintiff for the loss. Corrective justice goes to the nature of
the obligation; it does not prescribe the mechanism by which the obligation is
discharged. Liability insurance presupposes liability, and it is that liability
which is intelligible in the light of corrective justice. Nothing about corrective
justice precludes the defendant from anticipating the possibility of liability by
investing in liability insurance.50

Any tendency of liability insurance to undermine corrective justice is
largely a function of how accurately the insurance is priced. If the price of
insurance accurately reflects the injurer’s level of care, then the injurer, and not
the insurance company, compensates the victim. Furthermore, the amount the

44. Id. at 2350.
45. George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1972).
46. See generally PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW, supra note 42; Ernest J.
Weinrib, Corrective Justice and Formalism: The Care One Owes One’s Neighbors, 77 IOWA L.
REV. 403 (1992).
47. See Fletcher, supra note 45 (noting that corrective justice is based on reciprocity of risk);
Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 152 (1973) (noting that
corrective justice is based on causation of harm); Jules L. Coleman, Moral Theories of Torts:
Their Scope and Limits: Part I, 1 LAW & PHIL. 371 (1982); Jules L. Coleman, Moral Theories of
Torts: Their Scope and Limits: Part II, 2 LAW & PHIL. 5 (1983) (proposing that one should
develop “foundational” principles, and use them to formulate specific rules for resolving cases);
Ernest J. Weinrib, Toward a Moral Theory of Negligence Law, 2 LAW & PHIL. 37 (1983) (noting
that corrective justice based on Kantian principles); Wells, supra note 43 (noting that tort law
should strive to enforce community standards of just compensation; this should be accomplished
by using procedures that encourage juries to do justice in individual cases).
48. DEWEES ET AL., supra note 29, at 41.
49. Schwartz, supra note 32, at 331-36.
50. ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 135-36 n.25 (1995).
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injurer pays is based on her fault. Recall from our prior example51 that if
insurance is properly priced, an insured that creates a five percent risk of
causing a $10,000 harm would pay a premium of $500, and an insured that
creates an eight percent risk of causing the same harm would pay an $800
premium. The effect of an injurer having insurance is that she makes
incremental payments to the insurance company in advance for the harm likely
to result from the risks that she creates. Thereafter, the insurance company
pays the victim if a risk materializes in a loss. But it is the injurer, and not the
insurance company, who compensates the victim. The money for the payment
comes from the premiums paid by the injurer because over the long run the
injurer pays sufficient premiums to cover the losses that she causes. It is only
when the price of insurance does not accurately reflect the injurer’s level of
care that corrective justice is undermined. In such circumstances, the injurer
may pay an insurance premium that is either too low or too high to finance the
payment of the victim’s damages.
Even if insurance is accurately priced, one can defend liability insurance
on corrective justice grounds. Liability insurance can serve to smooth the
blunt edges of the tort system from the perspective of both the victim and the
injurer. Victims benefit from insurance because in its absence, many tort suits
would not be brought on account of injurers not having enough assets to make
the suit worthwhile. The injurers in such cases would escape the civil justice
system entirely, and this result might well undermine corrective justice to a
greater extent than permitting injurers to purchase imperfectly priced liability
insurance.52 Injurers also benefit from insurance. This is especially true in
cases where an injurer whose negligence is slight produces enormous damage.
In such cases, the availability of liability insurance can ease the crushing
burden that would otherwise fall on one whose wrong is minor.53 Further, one
can argue that intentional act exclusions in liability policies facilitate bringing
51. See supra text accompanying notes 30-33.
52. Cf., Ellen S. Pryor, The Stories We Tell: International Harm and the Quest for Insurance
Funding, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1721, 1750 (1997).
53. See Tony Honoré, The Morality of Tort Law—Questions and Answers, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW, supra note 42, at 89-90.
[T]hough loss spreading (through third-party insurance) is distributive, the reason why it
is needed as an adjunct to the tort system is, in part at least, to satisfy the demands of
retributive justice. It serves to cushion losses which, whether defendants are at fault or
not, are out of scale with the gravity of their conduct. This does not entail that loss
spreading is an aim of the tort system as such, merely that some form of insurance is
essential if a system of corrective justice is to operate fairly in modern conditions.
Id. See also Jeremy Waldron, Moments of Carelessness and Massive Loss, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW, supra note 42 (contrasting two drivers, Fate and Fortune, who are
momentarily inattentive; no consequence arises from Fortune’s carelessness; Fate’s neglect
causes $5 million of bodily injury to innocent victim; “[third-party] [i]nsurance makes Fate’s
predicament easier to accept”).
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the full measure of tort law’s sanction on parties whose deliberate wrongs
produce injury.
On the other hand, the pervasive use of liability insurance might
undermine the ability of the tort system to achieve corrective justice. Dewees,
Duff and Trebilcock argue that this has occurred in Canadian automobile
accident law, where tort liability has become more of a strict liability
compensation system than a fault-based corrective justice system.54 This
transformation, they contend, has resulted from a number of factors. First, the
widespread use of liability insurance “has encouraged judges and juries to
elevate the effective standard of care expected of a driver from that of a
reasonable driver susceptible to inadvertent mistakes and momentary lapses of
attention, to that of an exceptional driver divested of such unseemly human
traits.”55 Second, most cases are settled by insurance company employees
who, without legal advice, apply “rules of thumb which have little relation to
liability rules as applied by appellate courts.”56 Third, even where liability is
based on fault, it is “the institution of liability insurance that ultimately dictates
the amount of compensation actually received and the extent to which damages
are actually ‘corrected’ by the wrongdoer.”57 Therefore, it is impossible to
achieve complete corrective justice if liability insurance fails to fully penetrate
the relevant market. Even in compulsory liability systems, it is impossible to
achieve one hundred percent compliance.58 Thus, wrongful injuries will often
remain uncorrected through the tort system if uninsured and underinsured
drivers do not fully compensate plaintiffs for the injuries they inflict, which
experience shows will usually be the case.59
A third normative perspective, led by such scholars as Fleming James,
stresses distributive justice and communitarian values.60 The compensation
perspective urges “that accident costs should be borne collectively, not
individually, and that the tort system should be evaluated in terms of its
capacity to spread risk and provide meaningful, expeditious, and low-cost
compensation or insurance to the victims of these activities.”61 Imposing
liability on injurers ultimately shifts the costs of accidents to potential accident
54. DEWEES ET AL., supra note 29, at 39-42.
55. Id. at 40.
56. Id. at 41.
57. Id.
58. For example, despite laws in almost all of the states requiring car owners and drivers to
maintain liability insurance, approximately fourteen percent of the nation’s drivers are uninsured.
Insurance Research Council, IRC Study Estimates 14% of Drivers Are Uninsured, at
http://www.ircweb.org/news/uninsured2000.htm (Feb. 1, 2001).
59. DEWEES ET AL., supra note 29, at 41.
60. 2 FOWLER V. HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS 762, 759-64 (1956)
(“The best and most efficient way to deal with accident loss . . . [is] to distribute the losses
involved over society as a whole or some very large segment of it.”).
61. DEWEES ET AL., supra note 29, at 6.
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victims because these costs will be reflected in higher prices for goods and
services.62 Tort, then, functions much like insurance, and this function is
enhanced if strict liability is promoted, causation rules are diminished, and
other barriers to recovery in tort are reduced.63 Some adherents of the
compensation perspective deny that tort law is capable of achieving these
goals, and thus urge that the tort system be replaced with no-fault insurance
mechanisms.64 They, probably rightly, claim that as an insurance system, tort
law is too expensive, it leaves too many people out, and the implicit premiums,
in the form of higher prices for goods and services, are regressive because lowincome consumers (who have lower recoveries for economic losses) pay the
same premiums as high-income consumers.65
For the reasons discussed above, few scholars claim that the tort system
could effectively function as a compensation system.66 Yet, the compensation
goal cannot be completely dismissed. Many changes in the tort system, such as
the adoption of strict products liability and the almost universal adoption of
comparative negligence, can best be explained as an attempt to implement
cost-spreading principles. Plainly, insurance is highly relevant to these
attempts to provide compensation; without effective insurance and insurance
law principles that facilitate risk transfer and distribution, compensation
objectives are unattainable.
In the final accounting, whatever purposes one ascribes to tort law, the
importance of insurance cannot be disregarded. Although, as discussed above,
insurance law cannot guarantee that tort law’s rules will match up well with
tort law’s purposes, disorder in the house of insurance law can easily disrupt
tort law’s fulfillment of its underlying aims.
C. Insurance and the Torts Litigation Process
As Professor Mark Rahdert observes, “insurance usually determines
whether tort cases are brought, whom plaintiffs sue, how much they claim,
who provides the defense, how the case gets litigated, the dynamics of

62. Id. at 6-7.
63. For a more detailed discussion, see Priest, supra note 3, at 1534-36.
64. DEWEES ET AL., supra note 29, at 7.
65. Id.
66. See Schwartz, supra note 27, at 1801 (noting that most United States torts scholars
subscribe to either the deterrence school or the corrective justice school); CANE, supra note 1, at
456-57 (arguing that English law has never adopted compensation as a normative premise of tort
law; “the basic principle underlying social welfare programmes funded by general taxation is that
those who can pay ought to help those who are less well off. But the common law of obligations
has never adopted this normative principle. . . . The common law of obligations is seen as based
on notions of corrective justice rather than on any idea of distributive justice.”) (emphasis in
original text).
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settlement, and how much plaintiffs ultimately recover.”67 Rahdert’s first
point is clearly correct: if the tortfeasor is uninsured, the odds that the injured
victim will sue the tortfeasor decline. In many situations, the tortfeasor will
have no significant assets with which to pay a judgment owed a third party
apart from insurance. This is true not only with respect to individual insurance
but also in the commercial sector. Many commercial enterprises that are not
large enough to self-insure purchase liability insurance because of fear that
they will not have ample resources to satisfy a judgment obtained by a victim
of the firm’s negligence.68 If the tortfeasor denies liability for the victim’s
injuries and the tortfeasor is uninsured, it will rarely be productive for the
victim to pursue litigation against the tortfeasor unless it is a large commercial
enterprise.
If the tortfeasor is uninsured, the victim’s ability to obtain compensation
will frequently turn on whether the victim has first-party insurance (health
insurance for the medical expenses caused by an accident; disability insurance
for lost income suffered while the insured’s injuries prevent her from
employment; modest first-party medical payments coverage if an auto accident
is involved; perhaps some property damage coverage; and uninsured motorist
insurance if an uninsured tortfeasor injures the insured with a motor vehicle) to
help with these losses, but this is hardly a given. Millions of Americans lack
health insurance,69 and disability coverage is even more sporadic.70 If an auto
accident is the cause of the loss, first-party medical and uninsured motorist
coverage are optional in many states and therefore are often declined by
policyholders.71 Where the coverage exists, the limits are often less than the
typical tortfeasor’s liability coverage; underinsured motorist insurance, which

67. RAHDERT, supra note 1, at 1.
68. See CANE, supra note 1, at 432.
69. See Abraham & Liebman, supra note 1, at 80.
70. Approximately sixty million Americans (roughly fifty-five percent of the work force)
have some kind of short-term disability coverage (defined as coverage against disability lasting
less than two years), but only about twenty-four million persons (roughly twenty-two percent of
the work force) are covered by long-term disability plans. See Abraham & Liebman, supra note
1, at 81-82. Employees in medium and large private firms (100 or more workers) fare slightly
better. In 1997, forty-three percent of all employees had some kind of long-term disability
insurance plan, while fifty-five percent had some kind of short-term disability plan. U.S. Dep’t of
Labor, Employee Benefits in Medium and Large Private Establishments, 1997, at
http://www.bls.gov/ebshome.htm (released Jan. 7, 1999); Percent of Full-Time Employees
Participating in Selected Employee Benefit Programs, 1997, at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/
ebs3.t01.htm (last modified Jan. 7, 1999). Some government programs fill in these gaps, but they
only come close to replacing all income lost due to disability for only the lowest-income workers.
Abraham & Liebman, supra note 1, at 84-85.
71. See JERRY, supra note 20, § 134[a], at 866.
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is designed to make up this gap, is also optional, and is therefore frequently
nonexistent.72
If the tortfeasor has insurance, the calculus changes. In explaining why
this is so, one needs to begin with the language of the insuring agreement in
the typical liability insurance policy. The text of the Insurance Services Office
(ISO)73 Personal Auto Policy, to take one standardized form in widespread use
in the United States, reads as follows:
We will pay damages for “bodily injury” or . . . “property damage” for which
any “insured” becomes legally responsible because of an auto accident. . . . We
will settle or defend, as we consider appropriate, any claim or suit asking for
these damages. In addition to our limit of liability, we will pay all defense
costs we incur. Our duty to settle or defend ends when our limit of liability for
this coverage has been exhausted. We have no duty to defend any suit or settle
any claim for “bodily injury” or “property damage” not covered under this
policy.74

Other common insurance policies, such as the Homeowners Policy and the
Commercial General Liability Policy, have substantially similar language in
the insuring agreement.75 Policyholders become potential or actual defendants
in tort actions millions of times each year, and the foregoing language, or text
very similar to it, is implicated in each of these instances.
Tortfeasors who are covered by one of these policies are generally much
more attractive targets for injured victims. Of course, the victim must have
sufficient damages and a sufficiently plausible theory of recovery to make a
lawsuit feasible. But if this is true, it is probable that the victim will pursue
any and every potential defendant who has insurance that might be used to
compensate her injuries. To the extent the injured party has first-party
insurance, the victim will be less likely to sue, although the tortfeasor may not
escape litigation if the first-party insurer has and chooses to pursue subrogation
rights.76 In the same vein, the size of the claim may be a function of the
amount of insurance in force; the insured who increases her policy limits may
attract claims that would not otherwise be made.77

72. See id. § 134[c], at 875.
73. Insurance Services Office, Inc. is a leading supplier of statistical, actuarial, and
underwriting information for and about the property/casualty insurance industry, and provides
advisory services to more than 1,500 participating insurers and their agents. INS. SERV. OFFICE,
INC., WHAT IS ISO?, available at http://www.iso.com/docs/about.htm (visited Feb. 28, 2001).
74. INS. SERV. OFFICE, INC., PERSONAL AUTO POLICY, PP 00 01 06 98 (1997). For the most
recent version of the full text of this policy, see ROGER HENDERSON & ROBERT H. JERRY, II,
INSURANCE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS app. E (3d ed. 2001).
75. For texts of these other forms, see HENDERSON & JERRY, supra note 74, at apps. B
and C.
76. See CANE, supra note 1, at 432.
77. Syverud, The Duty to Settle, supra note 1, at 1114-15.
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In short, regardless of whether compensation is a legitimate function of the
tort system, the economics of litigation dictates that lawsuits be brought
against solvent defendants, and many potential defendants will be able to pay
the judgments rendered against them only if they are insured. By the same
token, the presence of insurance channels litigation against particular
defendants. As Professor Baker observes, “liability insurance determines who
is capable of being sued, for what wrongs, and for how much. The result is
that tort law in action is shaped to match the liability insurance that is
available.”78 But the relationship probably goes even deeper. As Dean
Syverud has observed, “[i]t may be that insurance precedes tort liability in the
sequence—that insurance institutions cause some forms of tort litigation to
come into existence, rather than the other way around.”79 He cites “clergy
malpractice” policies to illustrate a kind of coverage which was developed
before such claims were asserted, which implies that some kinds of tort claims
might never be made or recognized but for the presence of liability insurance.80
This point is also commonly made with respect to the elimination of various
immunities, which were often preceded by the introduction of liability
insurance coverage for claims that would otherwise fall within the immunity’s
protection.81
Beyond the implications of insurance on the question of who becomes a
defendant, liability insurance affects how litigation is conducted and resolved.
If the victim’s claim is covered, the liability insurer, as the insuring agreement
both requires and allows, will provide a defense with an attorney of its choice,
will exercise its privilege to settle the claim against the tortfeasor as it deems
appropriate, and will (barring unusual circumstances) control the conduct of
the defense. The rules for determining whether the insurer is required to
defend come in two very different versions. Stated briefly, the “eight corners”
rule requires the insurer to defend any time the plaintiff’s complaint alleges a
claim which, if true, would be within coverage; the insurer cannot consider
extrinsic evidence to escape the defense, just as extrinsic evidence is
inadequate to impose the duty. The “potentiality” rule requires the insurer to
defend whenever there is a potential for coverage, regardless of the
complaint’s specific allegations.82 The choice of rule has significant
ramifications for tort litigation; it affects whether the insurer takes defense
78. Tom Baker, Insurance and the Law, INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL AND
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES § 2.1. (Neil J. Smelser & Paul B. Baltes eds., forthcoming 2001)
(manuscript at 6), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol13/papers.cfm?cfid=430916&cftoken=
22383475&abstract_id=242026 (October 18, 2000).
79. Syverud, The Duty to Settle, supra note 1, at 1115.
80. Id.
81. See infra text accompanying notes 165-66.
82. See generally BARRY R. OSTRAGER & THOMAS R. NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON
INSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES 179-99 (10th ed. 2000).
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costs into account when calculating the settlement value of the plaintiff’s
claim, whether the duty to settle attaches (which is relevant for another set of
reasons, as discussed below), and whether insurance coverage disputes can be
resolved earlier in the litigation, which in turn can have several effects on the
resolution of the underlying tort claim.83
A plaintiff’s settlement strategies will often be a function of insurance; an
offer at or near the policy limits places pressure on the insurer, which, if it acts
unreasonably in denying a settlement offer, may be held liable for a judgment
exceeding the policy limits. Therefore, it is often wise for the plaintiff to make
a settlement offer in an amount that is decisively influenced by the available
insurance coverage, in the hope of parlaying this pressure into a larger
recovery in the future or perhaps inducing the insurer to accept a higher
settlement offer to avoid the risk of incurring an excess judgment.84
This last possibility—and many others like it85—can pit the insurer and
policyholder against each other. The policyholder, for example, may insist
upon a settlement within policy limits to reduce the risk of an excess judgment,
but the insurer, if it values the victim’s claim at a much lower level, may be
inclined to reject the settlement offer, try the case, and hope to defeat the
plaintiff’s claim. Of course, an error in the insurer’s assessment will expose
the policyholder to a threat of an excess judgment. Thus, the insurer and
insured may find themselves at odds over settlement strategy—and this is just
the beginning, for similar issues can exist when it comes to deciding how
vigorously to contest the victim’s claim, how many depositions to take, what
motions to file, how many witnesses to call at trial, etc. At some point, the
insurer will be obligated to appoint—or even to allow the insured to select—
independent counsel, but this drives up the insurer’s costs and makes
settlement relatively more attractive. The plaintiff, of course, would be wise to
exploit these tensions, hoping to parlay these conflicts into a higher settlement
offer. In the absence of liability insurance, none of these strategies is available
in the litigation of the underlying tort claim.
Just as the victim-plaintiff will want to exploit whenever possible the
friction points in the policyholder-insurer relationship, the savvy victim will
want to draft the complaint to bring the liability insurer into the picture. Thus,

83. For more discussion, see Ellen S. Pryor, The Tort Liability Regime and the Duty to
Defend, 58 MD. L. REV. 1 (1999) (discussing the ramifications of the insurance defense
obligation for the tort system).
84. For more on this dynamic, see Syverud, The Duty to Settle, supra note 1, at 1116-17.
85. Other examples include the insured’s failure to meet defense counsel’s and/or the
insurer’s expectations as to the insured’s cooperation obligation, the disclosure of information by
the insured inconsistent with coverage or other interests of the insurer, third-party claims where
coverage is in doubt, third-party claims which mix covered and noncovered claims, the presence
of multiple insureds with inconsistent interests, and the insured’s ownership of compulsory
counterclaims. For more discussion, see JERRY, supra note 20, § 114[d], at 807-19.
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if the tortfeasor’s injurious behavior appears intentional, the plaintiff will
frequently allege the tortfeasor’s negligence as one of the counts, taking
advantage of the insurance law rule that whenever covered and excluded
claims commingle in the same complaint, the insurer has a duty to defend all
claims.86 “Underlitigating” the case—i.e., bringing a negligence claim when
the tortfeasor’s action appears intentional87—makes insurance coverage
possible, gives the plaintiff the chance to negotiate a settlement funded by the
insurer, and provides nice opportunities for the plaintiff to exploit potential
conflicts between the insurer and insured (the insured will prefer any resulting
liability to be based on negligence, which supports coverage, whereas the
insurer will prefer any resulting liability to be based on intentional
wrongdoing, which is outside coverage), all to the end of negotiating a
settlement. Under the same logic, if the plaintiff has, say, twenty-six noncovered contract-based claims against a third party, the plaintiff would be wise
to attempt to articulate at least one negligence count in order to create the
possibility that a liability insurer will be required to provide a defense to all
twenty-seven claims in the “mixed action.”88
With all of liability insurance’s interesting implications for the tort
litigation process, it is easy to overlook liability insurance’s implications for
the pre-litigation settlement process. A significant percentage—probably in
the vicinity of sixty to seventy percent—of civil lawsuits settle without
adjudication;89 because most victim’s claims are fairly described as “small”

86. For more discussion, see Pryor, supra note 52, at 1729-35 (giving reasons why plaintiffs
have incentives to plead cases involving only intentional wrongdoing as negligence actions).
87. See id. at 1722. “By underlitigating, I mean the plaintiff’s choice to plead and prove
negligence rather than or in addition to intentional tort theories when, absent insurance
considerations, the plaintiff would either frame the case solely as an intentional tort claim or
emphasize the intentional tort claim.” Id.
88. For an example of such a situation, see Buss v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 939 P.2d
766, 770 (Cal. 1997).
89. Some authorities place the percentage in the range of ninety to ninety-five percent. See
Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Economics, and Settlement: A New Look at the
Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEX. L. REV. 77, 77 (1997) (citing authorities). “While it is true that most
civil suits are settled, the figure is nowhere near the 90 to 95% figure that has passed into
procedure folklore, and is more likely in the neighborhood of 60 to 70%.” Janet Cooper
Alexander, Do the Merits Matter: A Study of Settlement in Securities Claims Actions, 43 STAN. L.
REV. 497, 525 (1991) (reviewing data and studies). The ninety to ninety-five percent figure is
based on data showing the number of civil suits that do not go to trial, and some percentage of
these—perhaps around fifteen percent—are terminated as a result of some form of adjudication,
such as arbitration or a ruling on a motion. Another group of cases—perhaps around nine
percent—involve settlements after a court’s ruling on a significant motion. About “two-thirds of
cases . . . settle without a definitive judicial ruling,” but judges are involved in promoting
settlement in many of these cases. Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, “Most Cases Settle:” Judicial
Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1339-40 (1994) (citing and
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and “routine,” the percentage of claims that are resolved without the filing of a
lawsuit or without the involvement of a lawyer is probably at least that high.90
It has long been understood that the participation of an insurance company and
its adjuster in the pre-litigation claims resolution process has significant
ramifications for how formal tort law principles are applied and, consequently,
on who is compensated for accidental loss.91 The range of influential factors is
broad; among them are the attitudes of insurance adjusters and claims
personnel, pressures inherent in the organizational structure, and the full range
of variables that influence negotiation practices.92 That “law in action”
outcomes depart from what formal rules might otherwise predict is a
phenomenon hardly unique to tort law, but the liability insurer’s active
involvement in the claims resolution process provides plenty of leavening for
the tort liability mix.
Much more could be said about all of the above issues; most of these
observations provide much of the grist for the insurance law course. But it will
not work to leave the responsibility for exposing students to the torts-insurance
connection solely to the insurance law instructors. Insurance law is not taught
at every school (although the number of schools providing this offering
appears to be increasing), and we believe it to be an elective in every law
school curriculum where it is offered. Thus, if all law students are to
understand that tort law’s answers are reshaped to some extent by the

discussing Herbert M. Kritzer, Adjudication to Settlement: Shading in the Grey, 70 JUDICATURE
161, 162-64 (1986)).
90. See H. LAURENCE ROSS, SETTLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF
INSURANCE CLAIMS ADJUSTMENT 67-70 (2d ed. 1980) (discussing data on claims frequency;
“[m]ost claimants handle their claims directly with adjusters”).
91. See Fleming James, Jr., Accidental Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Insurance, 57
YALE L.J. 549, 566 (1948) (“The settlement practices of insurance companies constitute another
factor which has a great impact on the actual operation of tort law today. The vast majority of
accident claims never get into any stage of litigation; only an infinitesimal proportion of them
ever come to trial. The ‘law’ . . . then, consists in these practices.”); James & Thornton, supra
note 1, at 431 (“Realistically viewed, the practices of the carriers have become just as much rules
of law as the pronouncements of the courts interpreting traditional doctrines . . . .”); ROSS, supra
note 90, at 233-43 (discussing “tort law in action” in pre-litigation settlement of insurance
claims). A more tempered assessment was offered by Professor Allen Smith: “[I]nsurance
company and claimants’ settlement practices usually disregard doctrinal refinements, but they do
not make tort doctrine irrelevant.” Smith, supra note 1, at 667. But he still found the disjunction
between tort law and claims processing to be significant: “[O]ur claims system is not the familiar
tort process that is taught in the law schools and portrayed in the official mythology. Apparently
this disparity between myth and reality is due largely to failure to recognize the ways in which
liability insurance has changed the system.” Id. at 703.
92. ROSS, supra note 90, at 234 (“The reason the distribution predicted by knowledge of the
formal [tort] law does not fit the observed distribution of claims settlements is that other factors
influence the settlement process. . . . Among them are the attitudes and values of the involved
personnel, organizational pressures, and negotiation pressures.”).
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exigencies of the amount of insurance coverage, the terms of the insurance
contract, and principles of insurance law, this message must be conveyed in the
first-year torts course.
III. A “MICRO” PERSPECTIVE: TEACHING ABOUT INSURANCE IN TORTS
For the most part, first-year courses involve the study of particular cases
and how insurance affects the results in these cases will rarely be obvious.93
American case law is uniform in instructing factfinders not to take insurance
into account when determining whether and to what extent a defendant is liable
to the plaintiff.94 The logic underlying this presumption is that insurance is
irrelevant to the questions of whether the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff
and whether the defendant caused the insured’s loss.95 But, as examined in
more detail in the prior section, it is beyond dispute that the widespread use of
insurance has significantly shaped modern tort law and practice in multiple
ways. Few argue that expansions in tort liability in the 1960s and 1970s were
not influenced by the notion that some kinds of losses should be distributed
through insurance mechanisms; thus, whether the particular defendant did in
fact purchase insurance may have been irrelevant, but the extent to which one
of the parties could have purchased insurance for the loss or liability in
question was very relevant.96 But because insurance is supposed to be
irrelevant, it will rarely be mentioned as a rationale for the decision. Thus, the
dynamic of the tort-insurance intersection will not be readily apparent in the
results of particular cases and a thorough look is required to discern the nature
of these relationships.
Assuming the torts teacher concludes that some insurance matters should
be broached in the first-year torts course, a more pragmatic issue is
encountered next. With much to do in a four- or six-hour torts course,
precisely where and how is this material to be inserted in a course where most
93. For a discussion of this issue in the context of English case law, see CANE, supra note 1,
at 441-43.
94. See CHARLES TILFORD MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 201 (John W.
Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999) (“A formidable body of cases holds that evidence that a party is or is not
insured against liability is not admissible on the issue of negligence.”); FED. R. EVID. 411
(“Evidence that a person was or was not insured against liability is not admissible upon the issue
whether the person acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully. This rule does not require the
exclusion of evidence of insurance against liability when offered for another purpose, such as
proof of agency, ownership, or control, or bias or prejudice of a witness.”).
95. The most obvious manifestation of this value inheres in the customary prohibition on
even the mentioning of liability insurance in the presence of a jury. At the same time, however,
one can question whether juries are immune from insurance considerations; this, of course, is a
large question that, for the most part, will not be explored here.
96. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, at 594 (“[Insurance] is not to be considered in
determining whether anyone is liable in the first instance.”); CANE, supra note 1, at 456 (making
same point in discussion of English law).
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torts teachers already feel stretched to the limit? Fortunately, much bedrock
tort law does not directly implicate insurance. A student’s comprehension of
the elements of various torts, the scope of various privileges and defenses, the
definition of defamation and the scope of protected privacy interests, to take a
few examples, does not depend on and is not materially benefited by
examining insurance law concepts. But in many other parts of the course,
insurance is in play and it is impossible to explore the implications of
insurance in all areas where insurance law is influential to tort doctrine. With
that significant caveat in mind, we offer a few suggestions for areas that can be
enhanced by integrating insurance concepts into the discussion.
A.

Negligence

A notable exception to the proposition that insurance often affects the
theories and strategies of the parties, but is seldom mentioned by either
litigants or courts, is the court’s decision in Ryan v. New York Central Railroad
Co.,97 an 1866 New York case. In Ryan, the court not only mentions insurance
but also takes insurance into account in formulating a substantive tort rule. In
Ryan, the defendant railroad negligently maintained an engine that set fire to
the railroad’s woodshed, located one hundred and thirty feet from the
plaintiff’s house. Heat and sparks from this fire spread to the plaintiff’s house,
setting it on fire.98 In the plaintiff’s suit for the loss of the house, the court
framed the issue as follows: “A house in a populous city takes fire, through the
negligence of the owner or his servant; the flames extend to and destroy an
adjacent building: Is the owner of the first building liable to the second owner
for the damage sustained by such burning?”99 The governing principle for
resolution of the issue was a familiar one: “[E]very person is liable for the
consequences of his own acts,” meaning that every person is “liable in
damages for the proximate results of his own acts, but not for remote
damages.”100 The railroad’s negligence was a given, but the following
question remained: Was the damage to the house proximate or remote? The
court answered that the damage to the woodshed and its contents was
proximate, but “beyond that, it was remote.”101 The formal basis for the
holding was the court’s assertion that the first building (the shed) catching fire
could be anticipated or expected, but that the second building (plaintiff’s
house) catching fire was “not a natural and expected result” of the first fire.102

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

35 N.Y. 210 (1866).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 213.
Ryan, 35 N.Y. at 212.
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On the surface this rationale appears fatuous. In 1854, New York was
comprised of many wooden buildings located close to one another. Fire was
an ever present danger. How could an intelligent New York City resident not
“expect” that when one such building is set on fire, the fire will spread to a
nearby building? The actual basis for the court’s decision is revealed in its
policy discussion. The court explained that making the railroad liable for
remote losses would impose upon it a crushing financial burden of full liability
in circumstances where no amount of due care could prevent the massive
losses:
To sustain such a claim as the present, and to follow the same to its legitimate
consequences, would subject to a liability against which no prudence could
guard, and to meet which no private fortune would be adequate. Nearly all
fires are caused by negligence, in its extended sense. In a country where
wood, coal, gas and oils are universally used, where men are crowded into
cities and villages, where servants are employed, and where children find their
home in all houses, it is impossible that the most vigilant prudence should
guard against the occurrence of accidental or negligent fires.103

Who, then, should bear the loss? One option would have the railroad
purchase insurance on property adjacent to its rights-of-way and owned by
others, covering the property for loss caused by the operations of the adjacent
railroad. Whatever financial capacity the railroads might have to make this
purchase, insurance law foreclosed this option, as the court recognized: “A
man may insure his own house or his own furniture, but he cannot insure his
neighbor’s building or furniture, for the reason that he has no interest in
them.”104 The reference to “interest” was, to be more precise, a reference to
the insurance law’s “insurable interest doctrine,” which requires a contract of
insurance to be based upon an insured’s legal interest in property upon which
the insurance is procured.105 In other words, the railroad could validly
purchase a policy of insurance on its own engines, cars, buildings, etc., but the
railroad could not purchase insurance on property owned by others, even if the
103. Id. at 216.
104. Id.
105. The insurable interest requirement originated in English statutory law in the mid-1700s.
The immediate cause for two acts of Parliament, one with regard to property insurance in 1746
and the other with regard to life insurance in 1774, was the widespread practice of individuals
purchasing insurance on property they did not own or on lives to which they had no relationship
as a simple wager on the continued existence of property or the cestui que vie’s survival. The
concern was not so much the gambling as it was the moral hazard, i.e., the incentive the
arrangement created for the owner of the policy to cause the loss of the insured property or the
destruction of the insured life. In the United States, the insurable interest doctrine was first
adopted by courts, although many states would later enact statutes requiring an insurable interest
as a prerequisite to a valid contract of insurance. Currently, there are two distinct approaches to
the insurable interest doctrine in property insurance: the legal interest test and the factual
expectancy test. For more discussion, see JERRY, supra note 20, at 233-50.
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proceeds of the insurance would be paid to the owners of property destroyed
on account of the railroad’s operation.
The insurable interest doctrine would not prohibit the railroad from
purchasing insurance to cover its own liabilities to adjacent property owners
damaged by the railroad’s negligence, but liability insurance of this sort did not
exist in 1854.106 Thus, the issue for the court was whether the railroad should
be required to indemnify those injured by its negligence, and the court’s
answer to this question was no:
To hold that the owner must not only meet his own loss by fire, but that he
must guarantee the security of his neighbors on both sides, and to an unlimited
extent, would be to create a liability which would be the destruction of all
civilized society. No community could long exist, under the operation of such
a principle. In a commercial country, each man, to some extent, runs the
hazard of his neighbor’s conduct, and each, by insurance against such hazards,
is enabled to obtain a reasonable security against loss. To neglect such
precaution, and to call upon his neighbor, on whose premises a fire originated,
to indemnify him instead, would be to award a punishment quite beyond the
offense committed.107

The court’s explicitly expressed concern was that the third-party indemnity
obligation would be unbounded and that unbounded liability could not be
afforded by business. The appropriate course, according to the court, would be
for property owners to purchase first-party insurance to protect their interests
in property adjacent to railroads.108
Property owners would, of course, have good reason to purchase first-party
insurance on their property regardless of their proximity to railroads. Many
kinds of perils could cause damage to property, not the least of which was the
property owner’s own negligence.109 Therein resided another rub for the
railroad: if the railroad were liable in tort to the owners of adjacent property for
damage to the property, the law of subrogation would turn first-party insurers,
in their status as subrogees, into plaintiffs in tort actions against the railroads

106. See supra text accompanying notes 7-15.
107. Ryan, 35 N.Y. at 216-17.
108. It is interesting to speculate on whether the existence of a third-party insurance market
would have changed the court’s analysis. The court shows concern for overdeterrence; making
the railroad liable for all remote losses would impose a liability on the railroad far in excess of the
gravity of the railroad’s negligent act or omission and cause the “destruction of all civilized
society.” Id. at 217. If, however, the railroad could have spread this liability risk through an
insurance mechanism that involved the payment of a stream of certain, smaller premiums, the
“punishment quite beyond the offense” issue would have been removed from the calculus;
perhaps this would have changed the outcome. Id.
109. See Adden v. White Mountains N.H. R.R., 55 N.H. 413, 415-16 (1875) (explaining that
even when liability is placed by statute on railroad, it is prudent for adjacent property owner to
have first-party insurance).
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and pitting the insurance industry against the railroads was something to be
avoided.
It is to be considered, also, that if the negligent party is liable to the owner of a
remote building thus consumed, he would also be liable to the insurance
companies who should pay losses to such remote owners. The principle of
subrogation would entitle the companies to the benefit of every claim held by
the party to whom a loss should be paid.110

Thus, the existence of first-party insurance became, in itself, a reason for
declining to recognize a tort duty owed by the railroad to remote victims of the
railroad’s negligence.
With the advent of liability insurance in the 1880s,111 the rationale for
Ryan’s special rule of proximate cause disappeared, and the decision today has
little effect.112 Yet Ryan is a wonderful case to use in a torts course. It
illustrates the kinds of policy considerations that might lead a court to
arbitrarily declare which results are foreseeable and which are not. It also
provides the professor with an opportunity to explore why the court believed
that liability in Ryan would lead to the “destruction of all civilized society.”
This nicely leads into an exploration of the notion that some people are risk
averse, that imposing liability on risk-averse people produces undesirable
consequences and that properly priced liability insurance can neutralize those
undesirable consequences.
A more contemporary excursion into the law of negligence is provided by
Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment Corp.,113 an early case
exemplifying the modern trend toward holding businesses liable for failure to
protect persons on their premises against criminal attack. In Kline, a landlord
of a large apartment building was held liable for failing to protect a tenant from
a criminal attack in a common hallway on the premises.114 When the tenant
first moved in the building, the landlord provided a doorman to protect
residents, but discontinued that protection prior to the attack.115 The court
believed that imposing liability on landlords would reduce such criminal
attacks because the landlord was in a better position than the tenant to take
necessary protective measures.116 Numerous recent cases have imposed
liability for failure to prevent similar attacks, either in the defendant’s building
or on an adjacent parking lot, even in the absence of an undertaking. The

110. Ryan, 35 N.Y. at 217.
111. See discussion supra Part I.A.
112. Brennan Constr. Co. v. Cumberland, 29 App. D.C. 554, 559 (1907) (recognizing that
Ryan has been rejected outside New York and is severely restricted in New York).
113. 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
114. Id. at 478.
115. Id. at 479.
116. Id. at 480-81.
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courts merely require a showing that the defendant negligently failed to take
reasonable precautions against a sufficiently foreseeable criminal attack.117
In tort law, this line of cases presents a challenging and difficult issue. The
question is, essentially, to what extent commercial enterprises should be
encouraged to make investments in loss prevention. Businesses realize that
even very large investments cannot prevent all third-party assaults on
customers and that the marginal returns from such investments begin to erode
fairly quickly as these investments are increased. Businesses also realize that it
is very difficult to accurately predict whether a jury will find that any given set
of precautions satisfies the business’s due care obligation. A risk-averse firm
might be deterred from providing socially useful services that subject it to the
risk of liability for criminal attack unless it can insure against that risk.
Interestingly, this is an area where some insurers are not eager to cooperate
with businesses that desire to transfer the risk of foreseeable liabilities. The
Commercial General Liability (CGL) policy is the ISO’s standardized form for
commercial liability risks, and this form is widely used in the United States by
firms of all sizes.118 Some insurers tailor certain aspects of the form for some
customers, and some CGL policies exclude coverage for harm arising out of an
assault and battery.119 This exclusion is particularly common in policies sold
to taverns, restaurants and other businesses where alcoholic beverages are
served and rowdiness might be anticipated from time to time.120 Formulations
of the exclusion vary. Some limit the effect of the exclusion to assaults or
batteries committed by the insured or its employee; this language has a
different range of operation than text purporting to exclude, for example, any
claim against the insured “arising out of” an assault or battery. This latter
formulation might be applied to exclude coverage for a claim that the insured
negligently supervised a parking lot, which neglect contributed to one
customer’s assault upon another in a dispute over a parking place.121 If the
landlord’s policy in Kline contained an assault and battery exclusion, one could
not dismiss the possibility that an insurer—and perhaps a court—would
interpret and apply the provision to exclude liability insurance coverage, even
though the exclusion might undermine tort policy by causing overdeterrence.

117. DOBBS, supra note 1, § 325, at 881-82 (citing cases).
118. HENDERSON & JERRY, supra note 74, at 536.
119. For more information about the exclusion and how courts respond to it, see Kimberly J.
Winbush, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Effect of Assault and Battery Exclusion in
Liability Insurance Policy at Issue, 44 A.L.R. 5th 91 (1996).
120. For a case where the exclusion is implicated in the tavern setting, see Capitol Indem.
Corp. v. Blazer, 51 F. Supp. 2d 1080 (D. Nev. 1999). This case is excerpted in HENDERSON &
JERRY, supra note 74, at 611-17.
121. See, e.g., Hickey v. Centenary Oyster House, 719 So. 2d 421 (La. 1998) (customer shot
by armed robber in the parking lot of a restaurant sued a private security firm and its CGL
insurer).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2001]

TEACHING TORTS WITHOUT INSURANCE

883

From an insurance perspective, the logic behind such a broad exclusion is not
readily apparent. It is reasonable enough for an insurer to further the policy
inherent in the intentional act exclusion found in all policies by also excluding
coverage for bodily injury or property damage caused by the assaults and
batteries committed by an insured and its employees that commit intentional
torts in the scope of their employment.122 It is not obvious, however, why a
firm should be unable to insure the derivative consequences of wrongful acts
by third parties not under the control of an insured or any of its employees. In
other words, if the loss from the insured’s point of view is unintentional and
fortuitous, the liability for the loss should be insurable, just like most
negligence liability risks.
Thus, as tort law places duties on businesses based on the assumption that
commercial firms can transfer these risks to insurance markets, structural
barriers in insurance markets may intercede to prevent tort law from achieving
its risk distribution and deterrence objectives. The absence of insurance
coverage may be followed by inefficient investments in loss prevention, or by
the withdrawal of useful goods and services from the market. Again, the
essential point is that whether tort law can achieve its underlying objectives
cannot be ascertained without examining tort law’s intersection with insurance
law principles.
B.

Intentional Torts

Many torts courses begin with an excursion through intentional torts.
Garratt v. Dailey123 is a classic in this area; it is included in most torts
casebooks. The point of the case is to illustrate the two-pronged definition of
intent. An actor intends a result if the actor either acts for the purpose of
causing the result or acts knowing that the result is substantially certain to
occur.124 The case also illustrates that a very young child can be liable for an
intentional tort as long as he has sufficient mental capacity to entertain the
requisite intent.125 In Garratt an adult sued a five-year old child for battery.
The plaintiff attempted to prove that the defendant pulled the plaintiff’s lawn
chair out from under her as she began to sit down, causing her to fall to the
ground.126 The defendant’s evidence indicated that he moved the chair before
122. Even this point is not beyond dispute. Many kinds of business establishments,
particularly taverns and bars, can anticipate their employees being exposed to groundless tort
claims for battery after acting appropriately to remove dangerously inebriated guests from the
premises; it would seem that insurers should offer a product, or an endorsement to standard
coverage, in the nature of “litigation insurance” to firms that can foresee this kind of potential
liability.
123. 46 Wash. 2d 197 (1955).
124. Id. at 200.
125. Id. at 200, 202.
126. Id. at 198-99.
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the plaintiff began to sit down and that by the time he discovered that she was
attempting to sit down, it was too late for him to replace the chair.127 The trial
judge, sitting as trier of fact, accepted the defendant’s version of the facts and
entered a judgment for the defendant on the basis that there was no intent to
injure.128 The appellate court pointed out that the defendant could still be
liable under the facts as found by the trial judge. This would be the case if, at
the time the defendant moved the chair, he knew with substantial certainty that
the plaintiff would attempt to sit in the place where the chair had been. The
appellate court remanded for clarification of the findings to make sure that the
trial judge had not overlooked this possibility.129 On remand, the trial court
reconsidered its findings and entered a judgment against the defendant for
$11,000.130
Intentional tort cases have many implications for insurance worthy of
discussion in a torts class, yet no torts teacher would want to discuss all of
them in conjunction with the treatment of a single case, such as Garratt.
While we discuss a number of insurance implications in conjunction with
Garratt below, note that many of these implications can easily be raised with
other cases.
The first and most obvious implication for insurance arising out of
intentional tort cases is whether the judgment will be paid by an insurance
company. If not, the corrective justice, deterrence, and compensation
functions of tort law are likely to be frustrated. As noted earlier, many
tortfeasors have no assets from which to collect a judgment, and this is
particularly true of intentional tortfeasors. Infants, in cases like Garratt, are
technically liable for their torts, but most infants have no assets and, in the
absence of a statute, parents are not vicariously liable for the torts of their
children. If the impoverished tortfeasor is uninsured, a judgment lien on her
future earnings may, at least theoretically, deter her from antisocial conduct,
and the message is still sent to others who are aware of the outcome. If the
judgment is collected in the future, compensation and corrective justice goals
are also achieved. Yet, most plaintiffs would not pursue a tort action unless
there was some hope of collecting the judgment in the near future. Therefore,
depending on the tortfeasor’s personal resources, lack of insurance may
undermine tort law’s major policies. If, however, the tortfeasor has liability
insurance, insurance law has varying answers that will affect significantly
whether tort law’s purposes are attained.
The most likely source of insurance coverage for an intentional tortfeasor
is either her homeowner’s insurance policy, if she is an adult, or her parent’s

127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at 199.
Garratt, 46 Wash. 2d at 199.
Id. at 201-02.
Garratt v. Dailey, 49 Wash. 2d 499 (1956).
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homeowner’s insurance policy if she is an infant.131 The problem in
intentional tort cases is that such policies normally exclude coverage for bodily
injury or property damage that the insured expects or intends.132 Thus, if the
exclusion applies, the plaintiff in Garratt cannot collect the amount of her
judgment from the parent’s insurance company.
In insurance law, the meaning of the intentional act exclusion has been the
subject of much litigation, and judicial attitudes toward the exclusion are not
consistent. Construing the clause, courts generally define “intent” as requiring
a purpose to cause or a desire to bring about injury, while “expect” is
interpreted to require a subjective knowledge of a high probability that the
injury or damage will occur.133 Courts tend to divide over the degree to which
the insured must be aware of all the consequences of his act, developing what
are essentially three interpretations of what must be intended or expected by
the insured before coverage is lost. A plaintiff’s ability to recover from the
insurance company in a case like Garratt depends on which of the three
interpretations the court adopts. The majority of courts apply the exclusion if
the insured intended both to act and to cause some kind of injury or damage.134
Under the majority rule, it does not matter if the resulting injury differs from
the injury that the insured intended to produce.135 Under the majority approach
the exclusion would apply in Garratt if the defendant intended to cause any
injury, no matter how slight, and that a more serious or different kind of injury
resulted than the insured intended or expected would not prevent the exclusion
from eliminating the insurance coverage.136 If, however, the defendant merely
intended for the plaintiff to contact the ground in a humorous or objectively
offensive manner, the exclusion would presumably not apply, and the plaintiff
131. Homeowners’ policies contain not only property loss coverage for the insured’s home
and contents (subject to some limits and exclusions) but also liability insurance coverage for nonauto related liabilities that the insured might incur (again, subject to some limits and exclusions).
A renter’s policy typically contains similar liability protection. Such policies typically cover the
named insured and the named insured’s spouse if the spouse is a resident of the same household.
Further, the definition of “insured” also typically covers residents of the same household who are
relatives or who are under the age of 21 and in the care of the named insured, the named insured’s
resident spouse, or “any person named above.” See, e.g., INS. SERV. OFFICE, INC., HOMEOWNERS
2 BROAD FORM, HO 00 02 04 91 (1990).
132. For example, in the Homeowners 2 Broad Form, the policy excludes liability coverage
for bodily injury or property damage “[w]hich is expected or intended by the ‘insured.’” Id.
133. JERRY, supra note 20, at 401.
134. Id. at 403.
135. Id. at 404.
136. The operative term in the typical liability form is “bodily injury.” Courts have divided
on whether the term “bodily injury” includes nonphysical or emotional harm. Most courts hold
that “bodily injury” refers to physical injuries only and not to nonphysical or emotional harm, but
emotional distress, which has physical manifestations normally constitutes “bodily injury.” See
generally Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation, Homeowner’s Liability Insurance Coverage of
Emotional Distress Allegedly Inflicted on Third Party by Insured, 8 A.L.R. 5th 254 (1992).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

886

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 45:857

should be compensated under the insurance policy.137 The plaintiff would be
entitled to a judgment because the insured’s conduct would still constitute a
battery, and the insured would be liable for the unintended harm.
There are, however, two minority interpretations of the exclusion. First, a
few courts require the insured to intend both the act and the specific harm that
results from the act.138 This minority rule tends to narrow the exclusion and
expand the coverage. Unless the defendant in Garratt intended the bodily
harm that actually resulted (a very unlikely situation because most young
children would not foresee—let alone intend—the full extent of the harm the
prank was likely to cause), the defendant’s conduct would be covered by the
policy, which would ultimately inure to the plaintiff’s benefit. Under a second
minority rule, some courts require a showing that, first, the insured intended
the act and, second, the damages or injuries resulting from the act are the
“natural and probable” consequences of the act.139 Under this interpretation, it
would be much more difficult to get around the exclusion in Garratt. The
second minority rule expands the exclusion and narrows the coverage; indeed,
under this approach, the exclusion can apply even if the defendant did not
intend to cause injury, which eliminates coverage for negligently or
accidentally inflicted harm arising out of an intentional tort not intended or
likely to cause any harm.
Regardless of the interpretive approach followed in a particular
jurisdiction, the exclusion gives plaintiffs an incentive to rely on theories that
bring their cases within insurance coverage. If, for example, the plaintiff in
Garratt were concerned that her battery claim was covered by the intentional
injury exclusion, she might have alleged that by deliberately moving the chair,
the defendant negligently created a risk of injuring the plaintiff.140 As
discussed earlier,141 it may be in the plaintiff’s interest to “underlitigate” the
case; the plaintiff’s negligence theory has the advantage of causing the
plaintiff’s claim to fall squarely within the insurance coverage. Yet such a
strategy must confront the extreme difficulty of proving that a very young
137. This result should follow from the “prank” cases which have been litigated under the
intentional act exclusion. The typical fact pattern involves the insured playing a practical joke on
another, which goes awry and causes injury. Sometimes the insured’s judgment is extraordinarily
poor and physical injury should be foreseen as a result of the conduct. The tendency in these
cases, however, is for the court to find that while the act was intended, the injury was neither
intended nor expected and therefore the tortfeasor’s conduct is not excluded from coverage under
the liability contract. See JERRY, supra note 20, at 407.
138. Id. at 404.
139. Id. at 403.
140. See, e.g., Ghassemieh v. Schafer, 447 A.2d 84, 89 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982) (involving
facts very similar to those in Garratt, but brought on a negligence theory; the court recognized
that “the concepts of negligence and battery are not mutually exclusive.”). See generally Pryor,
supra note 52.
141. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
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child acted negligently.142 Another possibility, in at least some cases where a
child has committed a battery, is suing the parent for negligent supervision of
the child. While this theory may invoke insurance coverage,143 it also has the
disadvantage of being very difficult to prove.144 Yet, the plaintiff does not
have to prevail on such alternative theories to take advantage of the
defendant’s insurance. Insurance policies place a duty on insurers to defend a
claim brought against the insured, even if the claim is thought to be groundless
or meritless, as long as the alleged claim is within the policy’s coverage.145
Thus, if the plaintiff in Garratt had alleged both negligence and battery
theories against the child, the insurance company would have been required to
defend the entire “mixed action.”146 The advantage of such alternative
pleading is that the plaintiff can trigger the insurer’s obligation to defend the
insured against the tort claim,147 thereby creating the possibility of negotiating
a better settlement than if the defendant were the sole source of funds for a
possible settlement.148
As Professor Pryor has explained (and as discussed earlier),149
underlitigating can subvert tort policies. As also previously discussed,150 the
use of liability insurance is consistent with the tort policies of deterrence and
corrective justice as long as the price of insurance closely corresponds to the
risks posed by the insured. When underlitigating causes an insurance company

142. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283A (1965) (A child is held to the standard of “a
reasonable person of like age, intelligence, and experience under like circumstances.”).
143. Some courts treat a negligent supervision claim as being dependent upon excluded
conduct—i.e., another insured’s intentional wrongdoing—and uphold insurers’ denials of
coverage on that basis. In other words, the policy is treated as excluding from coverage any claim
“arising out of” an insured’s intentional wrong; thus, a claim that a parent negligently supervised
a child who committed an intentional wrong “arises out of” the excluded conduct (because the
child is an “insured”), and this derivative claim is therefore excluded from coverage as well. The
cases are not uniform, however. Compare Jones v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 937 P.2d 1360 (Alaska
1997) (motorized vehicle exclusion barred coverage for alleged negligent entrustment of
snowmobile to child and alleged negligent supervision of child) with Cambridge Mut. Fire Ins.
Co. v. Perry, 692 A.2d 1388 (Me. 1997) (daughter sued father for alleged sexual abuse and
mother for alleged negligent supervision in failing to protect her from father; held, intentional acts
exclusion did not bar negligent supervision claim).
144. The requirements for imposing a duty on the parent to control her child are set out in
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 316 (1965).
145. JERRY, supra note 20, at 735.
146. Id. at 737-38.
147. In this situation, the insurer is almost certain to provide the insured with a defense under
a “reservation of rights” to deny coverage at a later time—i.e., in the event the insured loses the
underlying tort suit and the insurer’s obligation to indemnify moves to the fore. For more
discussion, see JERRY, supra note 20, at 796-98.
148. Id. at 740.
149. See text accompanying supra notes 86-87.
150. See text accompanying supra notes 30-53.
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to pay for harm that the insured intentionally caused, the insured’s premiums
will usually not be high enough to pay for this harm because the coverage is
excluded from the policy.151 Because the premium the wrongdoer pays does
not fully cover the cost of the harm he caused, the wrongdoer has neither been
given the appropriate incentive to refrain from inflicting the harm, nor has he
corrected the injustice that he caused.152 Professor Pryor suggests that while
underlitigating completely subverts the policies of deterrence and
compensation, it may represent a “second best” solution for the corrective
justice policy.153 This is because, in the absence of underlitigating, the victim
will probably not sue the wrongdoer at all, thus allowing him to escape the
civil justice system entirely.154
To summarize, insurance law begins with the premise that non-fortuitous
losses are uninsurable.155 From this starting point logically flows the
observation that no insurance coverage exists for conduct intended or expected
from the insured’s standpoint, but the meaning of “intended” and “expected”
for purposes of applying the insurance policy exclusion is not necessarily the
same as the meaning of “intentional” for tort law purposes. The possibility
exists, then, that some intentional wrongs will be awarded insurance coverage,
and that some acts that are negligent may be denied coverage in some
situations and in some venues. The essential point to drive home to the
students is that in the area of intentional torts, application of tort law principles
alone will not provide a final answer on whether the objectives of tort law are
fulfilled.
C. Privileges and Defenses
Insurance law students are frequently surprised to learn that courts are split
on the question of whether the intentional act exclusion applies to intentional
acts committed in self-defense or in the defense of others. Some courts have
held that injury inflicted in self-defense is expected or intended under the
exclusion,156 but other courts disagree.157 How a court resolves this issue
usually has no bearing on the insurance company’s liability for a judgment
rendered against the insured.158 This is because there will be no judgment to
pay if the trier of fact determines that the insured acted in self-defense. If, on
151. Pryor, supra note 52, at 1747-48.
152. Id. at 1748.
153. Id. at 1750.
154. Id.
155. Even this seemingly simple and incontrovertible premise is more complex that it may
appear at first glance, but this is largely an insurance law concern. For more discussion, see
Pryor, supra note 52, at 1740-45.
156. JERRY, supra note 20, at 409.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 410.
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the other hand, the trier enters a judgment against the insured because it finds
that the insured did not act in self-defense, the insurance company would not
have to pay the judgment because of the intentional act exclusion. The true
significance of applying the intentional act exclusion to any intentional tort
action where the insured asserts self-defense is that the insurance company
becomes required to defend the action.159 The policy argument for requiring
the insurance company to defend is that most circumstances giving rise to the
need for self-defense are fortuitous (the kind of event that can properly be
insured against) and most insureds are willing to pay to insure against the costs
of such litigation.160 The practical effect of such coverage is that by bringing
the insurance company into the litigation, the parties increase the chance of a
settlement.161
Tort and insurance cases also differ in the way they treat diminished
mental capacity. An insane person is liable for her intentional torts as long as
she entertained the requisite intent.162 A majority of insurance law cases,
however, hold that the intended or expected act exclusion does not apply to
cases where the insured lacked mental capacity.163 In such jurisdictions
insurance companies will pay both the cost of defending intentional tort actions
against insane persons and the cost of judgments rendered against them. The
majority approach represents good policy. It is consistent with the purpose of
the intentional act exclusion (to deny insurance protection for intentionally
inflicted harm) because the insured is incapable of abiding by reasonable
standards.164 The approach also furthers the tort policies of corrective justice
and compensation by providing the means by which the insured can pay for the
victim’s loss.
D. Immunities
The abrogation of assorted immunities of liability during the late twentieth
century was one of the significant tort developments of that period. In many of
the cases so holding, the availability of insurance was mentioned as one of the
reasons justifying abrogation.165 One prominent treatise, in arguing that the
presence of liability insurance had little to do with this trend, marshals a

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id.
Id.
See supra notes 86-88, 147-48 and accompanying text.
McGuire v. Almy, 8 N.E.2d 760, 763 (Mass. 1937).
JERRY, supra note 20, at 410-11.
Id. at 411.
For more discussion, see KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, at 595 n.74 (citing examples);
GREEN ET AL., supra note 2, at 645-46 (“It is commonly thought that one of the principal effects
of liability insurance is evidenced in the gradual narrowing of all the various immunities from
liability . . . there would seem to be more than a coincidental connection between [liability
insurance and abrogation of immunities].”).
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lengthy compendium of authority indicating that insurance was not a pivotal
consideration in the abrogations.166
Regardless of the role that insurance played in the abrogation of
immunities, it is clear that it plays a significant role in litigation between
formerly immune parties. Some states, for example, have statutes waiving
sovereign immunity only to the extent that the defendant governmental entity
has liability insurance.167 Most intra-family litigation falls into two categories:
cases involving accidents where insurance is likely, and cases of sexual or
other deliberate abuse, where the nature of the conduct triggers the intentional
act exclusion and eliminates the coverage.168 Gaining access to insurance
proceeds is the only plausible explanation for most intra-family tort suits in the
first category. In Heath v. Swift Wings, Inc.,169 for example, a pilot and three
of his passengers were killed in a plane crash. The litigation was brought by
the estates of two of the passengers (the pilot’s spouse and their child) against
the pilot (their husband and father), claiming that the negligence of the pilot
caused the crash.170 In the absence of very unusual circumstances, there would
be no incentive to bring this litigation unless the pilot had liability insurance
that would pay any judgment obtained by the plaintiffs. This is a very useful
point to make while teaching such a case because it helps students to think
about the real world context in which such litigation is brought.
Most state courts permit the award of punitive damages.171 This is an
amount of money, in excess of compensatory damages, designed to punish or
deter tortfeasors.172 These are very different purposes. Punishment is designed
to cause suffering, while deterrence is designed to give incentives that will
induce people to take appropriate precautions.173 Punitive damages are
available only in cases of serious misconduct, as where the tortfeasor
intentionally inflicts serious harm or recklessly imposes a very high risk of
such harm.174
Whether punitive damages should be insurable is an interesting question
with subtle policy implications.175 All courts agree that public policy prohibits
166. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, at 595-96.
167. DOBBS, supra note 1, § 268, at 717.
168. Id. § 280, at 756; see also JERRY, supra note 20, at 407-09.
169. 252 S.E.2d 526 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979).
170. Id. at 527.
171. DOBBS, supra note 1, § 381, at 1062.
172. Id. § 381, at 1063.
173. Id.
174. Id. § 381, at 1065.
175. Whether punitive damages should be insurable has received much attention in insurance
law scholarship. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 1; Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 37, at 931-34;
Alan I. Widiss, Liability Insurance Coverage for Punitive Damages? Discerning Answers to the
Conundrum Created by Disputes Involving Conflicting Public Policies, Pragmatic
Considerations and Political Actions, 39 VILL. L. REV. 455 (1994).
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insuring against punitive damages for intentional torts,176 a position that is
clearly correct for reasons previously discussed.177 Liability insurance is
appropriate only for fortuitous, and not intended, losses. A two-thirds majority
of courts permit insurance for punitive damages arising out of reckless or
grossly negligent conduct.178 To the extent that punitive damages are used as a
deterrent, the majority rule, which permits insurance against punitive damages
for unintentional torts, appears correct. Since deterrence is an economic
concept, the insights of economists with respect to this issue are informative.
Two leading law and economics scholars, A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven
Shavell, argue both that punitive damages have an appropriate deterrence role
to play, and that such damages ought to be insurable.179
Economic analysis demonstrates that under a negligence rule, actors are
induced to use appropriate precautions if they know that they will be held
liable for all the harm that they cause in the event that they use inadequate
precautions.180 Holding wrongdoers liable for less harm than they cause will
induce them to take too few precautions, and holding them liable for more
harm than they cause may possibly induce them to take too many
precautions.181 Because punitive damages are awarded in addition to
compensatory damages, they could distort deterrence if awarded in cases
where defendants pay for all the harm that they cause.
Many negligent tortfeasors, however, do not pay for all the harm they
cause. For example, studies of medical negligence in the United States show
that only one claim is filed for every five to ten negligently inflicted injuries.182
Negligent tortfeasors can escape liability for a variety of reasons such as the
difficulty of proving an element of the plaintiff’s case or because the plaintiff’s
damages are too small to finance the cost of a lawsuit.183 A tortfeasor that pays

176. JERRY, supra note 20, § 65, at 472.
177. See supra notes 124-55 and accompanying text.
178. JERRY, supra note 20, § 65, at 475. Even states that prohibit insurance for punitive
damages make an exception in cases where a principal is held vicariously liable for punitive
damages awarded solely because of the culpable conduct of an agent. Id. at 476-77. This
exception is clearly justifiable because the principal is being held strictly liable in such cases.
179. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 37.
180. Id. at 883-85.
181. For a detailed explanation of why this is true, and for a discussion of the effect of the
amount of damages on activity levels, see Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 37, at 883-85.
182. Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Quiet Demise of Deference to Custom: The Role of the Jury in
Modern Malpractice Litigation 52 (Sept. 6, 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author)
(citing PATRICIA M. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE AND PUBLIC
POLICY 19 (1985) (a California study showed one claim for every ten negligently injured patients)
and David M. Studdert et al., Negligent Care and Malpractice Claiming Behavior in Utah and
Colorado, 38 MED. CARE 250, 254 (2000) (a Utah study showed one claim for every 5.1
negligently injured patients)).
183. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 37, at 888.
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full damages in some cases and escapes liability in other cases will be
underdeterred. Awarding punitive (or extra) damages in the cases where the
defendant is held liable can correct the underdeterrence problem by restoring
proper incentives. Polinsky and Shavell explain the nature of the problem and
the appropriate solution in the following passage:
[I]njurers will sometimes be able to escape liability for harms for which
they should be held responsible. The consequences of this possibility are
clear: if damages merely equal harm, injurers’ incentives to take precautions
will be inadequate and their incentive to participate in risky activities will be
excessive. Suppose that there is only a one-in-four chance that an injurer will
be found liable for a $100,000 harm, for which he would have to pay damages
of $100,000. On average, then, the injurer will pay $25,000 when he causes
the harm—only a fraction of the harm caused. If the harm could have been
prevented each time by taking a $50,000 precaution, the injurer will not have
an adequate incentive to take the precaution, because the precaution cost will
exceed his average liability cost by a substantial margin. Moreover, because
the injurer will pay only $25,000 on average for a $100,000 harm, he will
engage in the risky activity to an excessive degree. If the injurer is a firm, the
price of its product will rise by an amount reflecting only one-quarter of the
harm caused, leading consumers of the product to buy more of it, and thereby
cause more harm, than is socially desirable.
To remedy these problems of underdeterrence, damages that are imposed
in those instances in which injurers are found liable should be raised
sufficiently so that injurers’ average damages will equal the harm they cause.
In the example in the preceding paragraph, in which the chance of being found
liable for having caused a $100,000 harm is only one in four, damages should
be raised to $400,000. Then, on average, the injurer will pay $100,000 when
he causes the harm—on average, every four times he causes harm, he will be
found liable once for $400,000. Equivalently, his total damages will tend to
equal the total amount of harm that he has caused.184 As we emphasized
above, making injurers liable for the harm they cause will induce them to take
proper precautions and participate appropriately in risky activities.185

When punitive damages are properly used to further deterrence, they serve
exactly the same function as compensatory damages.186 Therefore, tortfeasors
should be allowed to insure against punitive damages for exactly the same

184. If the injurer does not engage in an activity repeatedly, but, say, only once, the injurer
obviously will not pay for the harm done, even approximately: he either will pay $400,000 in this
one instance (more than the $100,000 harm he caused) or will escape liability altogether.
However, the injurer’s expected damages—the damages he will have to pay if he is found liable,
multiplied by the probability of being found liable—equal the harm of $100,000 (because he has
a one-in-four chance of being found liable and made to pay $400,000).
185. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 37, at 888-89.
186. Id. at 932.
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reasons that they should be permitted to insure against compensatory
damages.187
The substantive tort rules determining when punitive damages are awarded
and in what amount are poorly designed to implement the approach to
deterrence described by Polinsky and Shavell.188 Courts award punitive
damages based on culpability rather than on the likelihood that a tortfeasor will
always be held liable for the harm she caused. When punitive damages are
awarded, the amount is based on such factors as the level of the defendant’s
culpability and the amount of her wealth, not on the discrepancy between the
amount of harm caused and damages paid.189 Under the Polinsky and Shavell
theory, for example, punitive damages would be desirable in medical
malpractice cases because studies show that only about two percent of medical
negligence leads to malpractice claims, and only about nineteen percent of the
most seriously injured malpractice victims receive compensation.190 Yet,
courts seldom award punitive damages in such cases because they usually do
not involve aggravated negligence. In short, the substantive law of punitive
damages is much better designed to achieve retribution than deterrence.
To the extent that punitive damages are used to punish, allowing their
insurability is probably undesirable. Insurance would not be objectionable if
the goal of punitive damages were to impose punishment according to the
magnitude of risk created by the tortfeasor, and if insurance premiums properly
reflected the risk each tortfeasor created.191 As previously discussed,192
however, it is very unlikely that insurance premiums can be perfectly
responsive to risk. Furthermore, charging a tortfeasor a premium that is too
low undermines retribution because the insurance provides the tortfeasor with
a subsidy by other less culpable insureds.193
E.

Procedural Rules

The California case of Jess v. Herrmann194 nicely illustrates how insurance
coverage influences courts in applying procedural rules affecting tort liability.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 897-98.
189. Id. at 900.
190. Russell A. Localio, Relation Between Malpractice Claims and Adverse Events Due to
Negligence, Results of Harvard Medical Practice Study III, 325 THE NEW ENG. J. MED. 245-51
(1991).
191. Schwartz, supra note 32, at 328. Professor Schwartz argues that under these
circumstances insurance enhances retribution. Without insurance, most wrongdoers escape
punishment because the risk they create does not cause an injury. With insurance, each tortfeasor
pays the correct amount, in the form of an insurance premium, without regard to whether their
risky conduct causes a loss. Id. at 328.
192. See supra notes 30-39 and accompanying text.
193. Schwartz, supra note 32, at 327.
194. 604 P.2d 208 (Cal. 1979).
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Jess involved application of California statutes concerning setoff in a
comparative negligence case.195 In Jess both the plaintiff and defendant were
injured in an automobile accident.196 Each party asserted a negligence claim
against the other, and the jury found that both parties were negligent.197
Because California employs a pure comparative negligence scheme, each party
obtained a verdict against the other party, and each verdict was reduced by the
amount of the claimant’s fault.198 The question for the court was whether the
normal setoff rule should be applied, so that the smaller judgment should be
subtracted from the larger judgment, resulting in only one recovery (a
diminished recovery by the holder of the larger judgment).199 The court held
that setoff should not apply because both parties were fully insured.200 Thus,
each party recovered their respective judgment, and each judgment was paid
by the other party’s insurance company. The court stated that in “a
comparative fault setting, the appropriate application of setoff principles
cannot be determined in the absence of a consideration of the parties’
Setoff is normally a rule of convenience that
insurance status.”201
“eliminat[es] an unproductive exchange of money between . . . the parties,”202
but the calculus is different in a comparative negligence context where both
parties are fully insured. The court observed that in this context setoff does not
operate as “an innocuous accounting mechanism or as a beneficial safeguard
against an adversary’s insolvency but rather operates radically to alter the
parties’ ultimate financial positions. Such a mandatory rule diminishes both
injured parties’ actual recovery and accords both insurance companies a
corresponding fortuitous windfall at their insureds’ expense.”203 Several other
courts,204 as well as the Uniform Comparative Fault Act,205 also take insurance
into account in determining whether setoff should apply in the comparative
fault context.
III. FINAL THOUGHTS
The conclusion that insurance has had—and will continue to have—a
profound influence on tort theory and process seems, at least to us, beyond

195. Id. at 209.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Jess, 604 P.2d at 209.
200. Id. at 211-12.
201. Id. at 210.
202. Id. at 209-11.
203. Id. at 211-12.
204. Stuyvesant Ins. Co. v. Bournazian, 342 So. 2d 471, 473 (Fla. 1976); Miller ex rel.
Grindell v. Amundson, 345 N.W.2d 494, 496-97 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984).
205. UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 3, 13 U.L.A. 348-49 (1977) (amended 1979).
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serious dispute. Moreover, that insurance can either further or frustrate tort
law’s underlying objectives is equally apparent. Sometimes the impact of
insurance on tort theory or process is obvious, and at other times the impact is
subtle and indirect. Sometimes insurance takes a prominent and explicit role in
a court’s formulation of a substantive rule. At other times insurance
considerations lurk in the background, providing the unspoken motives for
many of the parties’ tactical decisions, including who to sue, what claims to
assert, and what strategies to employ in the litigation. From the nearly infinite
number of illustrations that could be offered to illuminate the tort-insurance
relationship, we have selected several substantive and procedural contexts that
can be used to explore more deeply the importance of taking the effects of
insurance into account in teaching torts. We are convinced that students will
acquire a deeper understanding of torts if they are aware of the underlying
insurance considerations that motivate courts and litigants alike.
We are tempted, however, not to stop there. Our focus has been to
examine the effect that liability insurance has on the tort goals of achieving
corrective justice, appropriate deterrence and compensation. While most tort
scholars today deemphasize compensation or loss spreading as a free-standing
goal of the tort system, it is undeniable that tort law does compensate some
individuals. It is also undeniable that much of the expansion of tort liability in
the last forty years occurred because courts desired to implement loss
spreading principles. A question worth considering is how successfully the
tort system spreads losses in light of these innovations. This question cannot
be answered by examining tort law by itself or tort law as it is affected by
liability insurance. In a broader context, tort law works with a wide variety of
private and public insurance mechanisms—including health, disability, and life
insurance; first-party automobile insurance coverages; Medicare; Medicaid; the
Social Security Disability and Social Security Income programs; Workers
Compensation systems in the fifty states; and a number of federal programs,
ranging from the Veterans’ benefits programs, the Black Lung Benefits
Program, and more—to compensate victims of loss.206 When the boundaries
of the inquiry are defined as “loss compensation,” tort law’s compensatory
scheme is dwarfed many times over by these other compensation mechanisms.
One cannot even begin to come to terms with this big picture without thinking
about private and social insurance mechanisms.207 Only by looking at the big
206. For an illuminating survey of these programs and their lack of overall coherence, see
Abraham & Liebman, supra note 1.
207. One angle on this relationship that might be explored in either a torts or insurance law
course can be raised by asking the following question: if first-party insurance mechanisms are so
important, should some persons have a tort duty to procure insurance for the benefit of those over
whom they have some measure of responsibility? For example, it would be tortious for a high
school (be it the administration, the athletic department, or the coaches) to send football players
onto the practice field for a contact scrimmage without helmets, an indispensable piece of injury-
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picture can one evaluate what legitimate role, if any, tort law can play in
compensating for loss.
It is, of course, naive to think that any first-year law school course can
even begin to approach a meaningful study of these diverse systems of loss
compensation. We suggest, however, that at some point in the torts course
students should at least be alerted to the general contours of the big picture.
And it is here that exploration of the tort-insurance intersection may have some
of its greatest value: by insisting that first-year law students reflect upon the
impact of insurance law on tort doctrine and practice, one demonstrates that
acquiring an understanding of the substantive principles in a first-year course is
only a first step in a life-long effort to appreciate the rich doctrinal
relationships that permeate the entirety of the American legal system.

preventing equipment. Is it not just as senseless for the school to send its players onto the field,
where the risk of serious, disabling injury is ever-present and well-known, without another piece
of equipment—a policy of first-party insurance against the effects of disabling injury? The
answer given by courts is no. See Wicina v. Strecker, 747 P.2d 167, 173-74 (Kan. 1987); JERRY,
supra note 20, at 220-21. The reason why the law gives this answer provides an entry point for a
discussion of tort duties, first-party compensation mechanisms, liability insurance, individual
responsibility and communitarian values.

